Divide and compromise

被引：6
作者：
Nicolo, Antonio [1 ,2 ]
Velez, Rodrigo A. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Padua, Dept Econ, Via Santo 33, I-35123 Padua, Italy
[2] Univ Manchester, Sch Social Sci, Oxford Rd, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[3] Texas A&M Univ, Dept Econ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
来源：
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2017年 / 90卷
关键词：
EGALITARIAN-EQUIVALENT ALLOCATIONS; INDIVISIBLE GOODS; FAIR DIVISION; IMPLEMENTATION; PARTNERSHIP; ENVY; ECONOMIES; MARKET; MONEY; GAMES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.04.004
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We introduce two symmetrized versions of the popular divide-and-choose mechanism for the allocation of a collectively owned indivisible good between two agents when monetary compensation is available. Our proposals retain the simplicity of divide-and-choose and correct its ex-post asymmetry. When there is complete information, i.e., agents know each other well, both mechanisms implement in subgame perfect equilibria a unique allocation that would be obtained by a balanced market. The results hold for general continuous preferences that may not be quasi-linear. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：100 / 110
页数：11
相关论文
共 41 条
[1]   Room assignment-rent division:: A market approach [J].
Abdulkadiroglu, A ;
Sönmez, T ;
Ünver, MU .
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2004, 22 (03) :515-538
[2]   FAIR ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND CRITERIA OF JUSTICE [J].
ALKAN, A ;
DEMANGE, G ;
GALE, D .
ECONOMETRICA, 1991, 59 (04) :1023-1039
[3]   Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability [J].
Andersson, Tommy ;
Ehlers, Lars ;
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar .
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2014, 9 (03) :753-777
[4]   Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities [J].
Andersson, Tommy ;
Ehlers, Lars ;
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar .
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2014, 69 :43-49
[5]  
ARAGONES E, 1995, SOC CHOICE WELFARE, V12, P267
[6]   Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint [J].
Azacis, Helmuts .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2008, 62 (01) :140-154
[7]   Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods [J].
Bevia, Carmen .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2010, 39 (1-2) :209-222
[8]  
Brams S. J., 1996, Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution
[9]   Competitive fair division [J].
Brams, SJ ;
Kilgour, DM .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2001, 109 (02) :418-443
[10]   The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems [J].
Brown, Alexander L. ;
Velez, Rodrigo A. .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2016, 96 :115-131
12345