The relative unnaturalness of atheism: On why Geertz and Markusson are both right and wrong

被引:19
作者
Barrett, Justin L. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Inst Cognit & Evolutionary Anthropol, Ctr Anthropol & Mind, Oxford 0X2 6RN, England
关键词
Atheism; Cognition; Religion; Cognitive science; NATURAL WORLD; CHILDREN; EXPLANATIONS; EMERGENCE; BELIEFS; ORIGINS; PURPOSE; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1016/j.religion.2009.11.002
中图分类号
B9 [宗教];
学科分类号
010107 ;
摘要
Commonly scholars in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have advanced the naturalness of religion thesis. That is, ordinary cognitive resources operating in ordinary human environments typically lead to some kind of belief in supernatural agency and perhaps other religious ideas. Special cultural scaffolding is unnecessary. Supernaturalism falls near a natural anchor point. In contrast, widespread conscious rejection of the supernatural as in atheism appears to require either special cultural conditions that upset ordinary function, cognitive effort, or a good degree of cultural scaffolding to move people away from their maturationally natural anchor-points. Geertz and Markusson (2009) identify ways to strengthen cognitive approaches to the study of religion and culture, including atheism, but fail to demonstrate that atheism is as natural in a comparable respect as theism. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:169 / 172
页数:4
相关论文
共 21 条