Markets for rules: the promise and peril of blockchain distributed governance

被引：21
作者：
Cowen, Nick [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Lincoln, Sch Social & Polit Sci, Lincoln, England
来源：
JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND PUBLIC POLICY | 2020年 / 9卷 / 02期
关键词：
Liberalism; Political entrepreneurship; Blockchain; Cryptocurrency; New institutional economics; Private governance; INSTITUTIONS; EXCHANGE;
D O I：
10.1108/JEPP-03-2019-0013
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible contributions of blockchain technology to creating new governance structures that facilitate social cooperation. Design/methodology/approach Conceptual analysis with key ideas in new institutional economics and political theory is used in this paper. Findings Blockchain technology provides a new tool through which political entrepreneurs can credibly alienate some of their power within a system of rules that they have established. Originality/value This paper links discussion of blockchain entrepreneurship in commercial markets to research into private governance.
引用
收藏
页码：213 / 226
页数：14
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