The Tortoise or the Hare? Incrementalism, Punctuations, and Their Consequences

被引:30
作者
Breunig, Christian [1 ]
Koski, Chris [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 1A1, Canada
[2] Reed Coll, Portland, OR USA
关键词
punctuated equilibrium; budgeting; state politics; FISCAL-POLICY OUTCOMES; STATE BUDGET OUTCOMES; POLITICAL ATTENTION; PUBLIC-OPINION; DYNAMIC-MODEL; GOVERNMENT; EQUILIBRIUM; PRIORITIES; BUREAUCRATIZATION; EXPENDITURE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1541-0072.2011.00433.x
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
In this article, we contrast the long-term consequences of incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium. We test what the impact of each of these types of policy change is on long-term budgetary outcomes for the American states. Policy scholars have applied both theoretical approaches to the study of budgetary spending as an extension of policymaking. Given the two contrasting paradigms of policy change, we develop the following line of inquiry: Does punctuated equilibrium create a different budget in the long term than incrementalism? We address this question through an analysis of American state budgets because the U.S. states provide a rich variation in both budgetary outcomes and political institutions. We use budget data from all American states across all government functions for the period between 1984 and 2009. We find that, first, state budgets and budget functions vary in their degree of punctuation and, second, the degree of punctuation in a state's budget function corresponds to smaller long-term growth. Additionally, the kind of spending matters: allocational budget categories are more likely to exhibit punctuations.
引用
收藏
页码:45 / 67
页数:23
相关论文
共 88 条
[1]  
Albak E., 2007, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, V9, P1, DOI DOI 10.1080/13876980601145581
[2]   Party differences in state budget outcomes are there after all: Response to "Reexamining the dynamic model of divided partisan government" [J].
Alt, JE ;
Lowry, RC .
JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 2003, 65 (02) :491-497
[3]   DIVIDED GOVERNMENT, FISCAL INSTITUTIONS, AND BUDGET DEFICITS - EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES [J].
ALT, JE ;
LOWRY, RC .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1994, 88 (04) :811-828
[4]   A dynamic model of state budget outcomes under divided partisan government [J].
Alt, JE ;
Lowry, RC .
JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 2000, 62 (04) :1035-1069
[5]   Incrementalism in Appropriations: Small Aggregation, Big Changes [J].
Anderson, Sarah ;
Harbridge, Laurel .
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, 2010, 70 (03) :464-474
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2011, Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models
[7]   Party strength, party change and policy-making in the American states [J].
Barrilleaux, C .
PARTY POLITICS, 2000, 6 (01) :61-73
[8]   Electoral competition, legislative balance, and American state welfare policy [J].
Barrilleaux, C ;
Holbrook, T ;
Langer, L .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2002, 46 (02) :415-427
[9]  
Barrilleaux Charles., 2003, State Politics and Policy Quarterly, V3, P1
[10]   Punctuated equilibrium in French budgeting processes [J].
Baumgartner, Frank R. ;
Foucault, Martial ;
Francois, Abel .
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 2006, 13 (07) :1086-1103