The relationship between belief and credence

被引：60
作者：
Jackson, Elizabeth G. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Australian Natl Univ, Sch Philosophy, HC Coombs Bldg 9, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
[2] Ryerson Univ, Dept Philosophy, Toronto, ON, Canada
来源：
PHILOSOPHY COMPASS | 2020年 / 15卷 / 06期
基金：
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词：
belief; belief-first; credence; credence-first; degree of belief; dualism; epistemic rationality; Lockean thesis; lottery paradox; preface paradox; reduction; statistical evidence; LOTTERY PARADOX; RATIONAL BELIEF; EPISTEMOLOGY; PROBABILITY; JUSTIFICATION; LOGIC; PRAGMATICS; KNOWLEDGE; ACCURACY; TROUBLES;
D O I：
10.1111/phc3.12668
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief-credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far. Video link:
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页数：13
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