Improving efficiency in bilateral emission trading

When environmental damages from emissions are spatially nonuniform, permit trading has been modeled most often as a "pollution offset program" in which emission permits are traded between agents, subject to constraints on ambient air quality. To date the institution envisioned to implement such a program involves trading on a bilateral and sequential basis. However, simulation studies indicate that the sequence of trades may alter the outcome and undermine the cost savings from a pollution offset program. This paper identifies a design for the trading institution that tends to overcome this phenomenon and improve the efficiency of equilibria obtained in a simulation model. We model a bilateral trading process for the reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions with a stochastic description of the sequence of trades within groups of nations in Europe. When trading takes place between disaggregated, stylistic representations of economic enterprises, rather than between national governments, a significantly greater portion of potential savings is achieved. In fact, under most sets of assumptions, approximate first order stochastic dominance is achieved wherein the more decentralized the trading agents, the greater the expected savings from a trading program.