Communication and efficiency in auctions

被引：14

作者：

Kos, Nenad ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Bocconi Univ, Dept Econ, Milan, Italy

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2012年 / 75卷 / 01期

关键词：

Mechanism design; Message space; Communication complexity; INFORMATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders report simultaneously. We also show that the seller who chooses how to allocate a fixed number of messages allocates them evenly over all agents. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：233 / 249

页数：17

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