The article presents a critical analysis of early Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism. The authors argue that this theory cannot be a universal way of solving paradoxes. The theory of symbolism is a development exclusively in the field of the functioning of the sign system of the language, while in set-theoretical paradoxes, for example, in Russell's Paradox and The Burali-Forti Paradox, linguistic problems are not at all touched upon. The authors of the article carry out a critical analysis of Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism by analogy with the criticism of Alfred Tarski's concept of metalanguages presented in modern logical literature. The authors argue that the concept of metalanguages was needed by A. Tarski only because he presented The Liar paradox as an exclusively linguistic paradox. If Tarski had introduced the distinction between language and thought, then The Liar paradox could have been avoided without invoking the concept of metalanguages. Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism also speaks of the hierarchy of language signs, as well as Tarski's concept of metalanguages. According to Wittgenstein, paradoxes are also resolved by hierarchy, like according to Tarski. However, the theory of symbolism, like Tarski's concept of metalanguages, completely leaves the level of thinking without consideration. Is the idea of hierarchy necessary to solve the problem of paradoxes? Is it possible to solve the problem of paradoxes using the idea of hierarchy? The theory of symbolism cannot answer these questions if paradoxes are interpreted not only as facts of language, but also as facts of thinking. A critical argument against the theory of symbolism is also the fact that the late Wittgenstein recognizes the phenomenon of self-reference in language. This directly contradicts the main theses of Wittgenstein's concept of the early period of his philosophical activity.
