Permissive belief revision using default logic

被引:0
|
作者
Pimentel, CF [1 ]
Cravo, MR [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tecn Lisboa, Dept Informat Engn, Inst Super Tecn, P-1049001 Lisbon, Portugal
来源
7TH WORLD MULTICONFERENCE ON SYSTEMICS, CYBERNETICS AND INFORMATICS, VOL IX, PROCEEDINGS: COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING: II | 2003年
关键词
commonsense reasoning; belief revision; default logic;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
An important aspect of commonsense reasoning is the ability to revise our beliefs, i.e., change our beliefs, e.g. to get rid of a contradiction. Most existing belief revision theories consider beliefs to be atomic, i.e., they either choose to keep that belief or to abandon it. We believe this is a big handicap since one belief may incorporate several "sub-beliefs" not necessarily all true or all false. The idea behind permissive revision is to take the abandoned beliefs, weaken them, and add the weakened beliefs to the result of classical (in the sense of non-permissive) revision. So, the advantage of permissive revision over classical revision is that in some situations it allows us to keep more information. In this paper we modify a previous permissive belief revision theory to use Default Logic, as its underlying logic.
引用
收藏
页码:151 / 156
页数:6
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