Teleosemantics without natural selection

被引：16

作者：

Abrams, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Duke Univ, Ctr Philosophy Biol, Durham, NC 27708 USA

来源：

BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY | 2005年 / 20卷 / 01期

关键词：

belief; function; mental representation; naturalized intentionality; natural selection; teleology; wide content;

D O I：

10.1007/s10539-005-0359-7

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content (e. g. beliefs' truth conditions) in terms of function in the teleological sense, where a function is constituted in part by facts concerning past natural selection involving ancestors of a current entity. I argue that it is a mistake to base content on selection. Content should instead be based on functions which though historical, do not involve selection. I sketch an account of such functions.

引用

页码：97 / 116

页数：20

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