Movers and Shakers

Most projects, in most walks of life, require the participation of multiple parties. While it is difficult to unite individuals in a common endeavor, some people, who we call "movers and shakers," seem able to do it. The article specifically examines moving and shaking of an investment project, whose return depends on its quality and the total capital invested in it. We analyze a model with two types of agents: managers and investors. Managers and investors initially form social connections. Managers then bid to buy control of the project, and the winning bidder puts effort into making investors aware of it. Finally, a subset of aware investors are given the chance to invest and they decide whether to do so after receiving private signals of the project's quality. We first show that connections are valuable since they make it easier for a manager to "move and shake" the project (i.e., obtain capital from investors). When we endogenize the network, we find that while managers are identical ex ante, a single manager emerges as most connected; he consequently earns a rent. In extensions, we move away from the assumption of ex ante identical managers to highlight forces that lead one manager or another to become a mover and shaker. Our theory sheds light on a range of topics, including entrepreneurship, venture capital, and anchor investments.