Do sophisticated investors interpret earnings conference call tone differently than investors at large? Evidence from short sales

被引:104
作者
Blau, Benjamin M. [1 ]
DeLisle, Jared R. [1 ]
Price, S. McKay [2 ]
机构
[1] Utah State Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Jon M Huntsman Sch Business, Logan, UT 84322 USA
[2] Lehigh Univ, Perella Dept Finance, Coll Business & Econ, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
关键词
Earnings conference calls; Disclosure; Linguistic analysis; Information processing; Short selling; SHORT-SELLERS; DISCLOSURE REGULATION; INFORMATION-CONTENT; ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT; BAD-NEWS; ANALYSTS; LANGUAGE; MOMENTUM; READABILITY; QUALITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.02.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Recent research finds that investors, broadly defined, react to the linguistic tone of quarterly-earnings conference calls; there is a positive relation between firms' stock returns and call tone (a measure of "sentiment" related word tabulations). However, this type of soft information can be subtle, context-specific, and difficult to interpret. Moreover, the literature suggests cross-sectional variation in information processing skills among investors. Thus, we test whether sophisticated investors interpret earnings conference call tone differently than investors at large by examining short selling activity and its relation to earnings conference call tone. We find that short sellers target firms with simultaneous high earnings surprise and abnormally high management tone. The combination of positive earnings surprise and unusually positive tone strengthens short sellers' return predictability. This result indicates that short sellers interpret revealed "inflated" call language by managers more completely than naive investors. The incomplete stock price reaction by naive investors due to the lack of reliability that they place on this soft information results in overpricing of the stock. However, it also suggests that managers are unable to maintain prolonged overvaluation of their stock by striking an overly optimistic posture in the interactive conference call disclosure forum since short sellers' trades provide additional price discovery. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:203 / 219
页数:17
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