Political trust as rational belief: Evidence from Chinese village elections

Democratic governance is believed to improve government responsiveness to citizens' demand for public goods. In China, villagers' committee elections represent a major progress in China's development toward good governance. We develop a rational model to explain villagers' participation. Utilizing a national survey of rural residents in 2005, this paper tests the insights of the model. Two findings are of interest to the students of voting and elections. First, there is disagreement over the causal relationship between political trust and voting. This paper offers a rational interpretation of political trust by emphasizing the informational aspect of concept. Second, voting is generally theorized as a process of overcoming various costs. The prospect of benefits figures more prominently in Chinese village elections. Our findings highlight the pivotal role of township governments in China's rural politics and reveal the inner dilemma of democratization in China. Journal of Comparative Economics 39 (1) (2011) 108-121. School of Economics, Remin University of China. Haidian District, Beijing 100872, China: Department of Political Science, 124 Raymond Ave., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604, United States: Department of Political Science. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, United States: Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences. China. (C) 2010 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.