Assessing the Allocation of Pork: Evidence From Congressional Earmarks

被引:29
作者
Engstrom, Erik J. [1 ]
Vanberg, Georg [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Polit Sci, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[2] Univ N Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC USA
关键词
US Congress; distributive politics; earmarks; pork barrel; party leadership; POLITICS; BARREL;
D O I
10.1177/1532673X10369529
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Distributive politics represents one of the most important and controversial aspects of legislative policymaking. In the U.S. Congress, controversies over distributive politics are most evident in the area of legislative earmarking. In this article, we employ a unique set of data matching earmarks to their legislative sponsors to assess the leading explanations of distributive politics. We find that members of the majority party do considerably better than equally situated members of the minority. Moreover, party leaders target earmarks to those holding pivotal agenda-setting positions and to electorally vulnerable members. These findings have direct implications for both the extensive political science literature on distributive politics and the practical politics of earmarking reform.
引用
收藏
页码:959 / 985
页数:27
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