What the App is That? Deception and Countermeasures in the Android User Interface

被引:78
作者
Bianchi, Antonio [1 ]
Corbetta, Jacopo [1 ]
Invernizzi, Luca [1 ]
Fratantonio, Yanick [1 ]
Kruegel, Christopher [1 ]
Vigna, Giovanni [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Comp Sci, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
来源
2015 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY SP 2015 | 2015年
关键词
D O I
10.1109/SP.2015.62
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Mobile applications are part of the everyday lives of billions of people, who often trust them with sensitive information. These users identify the currently focused app solely by its visual appearance, since the GUIs of the most popular mobile OSes do not show any trusted indication of the app origin. In this paper, we analyze in detail the many ways in which Android users can be confused into misidentifying an app, thus, for instance, being deceived into giving sensitive information to a malicious app. Our analysis of the Android platform APIs, assisted by an automated state-exploration tool, led us to identify and categorize a variety of attack vectors (some previously known, others novel, such as a non-escapable fullscreen overlay) that allow a malicious app to surreptitiously replace or mimic the GUI of other apps and mount phishing and click-jacking attacks. Limitations in the system GUI make these attacks significantly harder to notice than on a desktop machine, leaving users completely defenseless against them. To mitigate GUI attacks, we have developed a two-layer defense. To detect malicious apps at the market level, we developed a tool that uses static analysis to identify code that could launch GUI confusion attacks. We show how this tool detects apps that might launch GUI attacks, such as ransomware programs. Since these attacks are meant to confuse humans, we have also designed and implemented an on-device defense that addresses the underlying issue of the lack of a security indicator in the Android GUI. We add such an indicator to the system navigation bar; this indicator securely informs users about the origin of the app with which they are interacting (e.g., the PayPal app is backed by "PayPal, Inc."). We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks and the proposed on-device defense with a user study involving 308 human subjects, whose ability to detect the attacks increased significantly when using a system equipped with our defense.
引用
收藏
页码:931 / 948
页数:18
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