Liquidation risks in the Rotemberg-Saloner implicit collusion model

被引:2
作者
Bagliano, FC
Dalmazzo, A
机构
[1] Univ Turin, Dipartimento Sci Econ & Finanziarie G Prato, I-10134 Turin, Italy
[2] Univ Siena, Dipartimento Econ Polit, I-53100 Siena, Italy
关键词
implicit collusion; countercyclical markups; capital market imperfections;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00210-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We extend the Rotemberg-Saloner's (1986) [Rotemberg, J., Saloner, G., 1986. A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms. American Economic Review 76:390-407] "implicit collusion" framework to the consideration of capital market imperfections, captured by a non-zero probability of liquidation of firms in recessionary periods. We show that the Rotemberg-Saloner result of countercyclical markups is quite robust to the extension and, moreover, liquidation risks may even strengthen the degree of markup countercyclicality. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:69 / 74
页数:6
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