With the signing of several lucrative deals on oil, gas, currency, and other bilateral and multilateral arrangements, Sino-Russian relations over the last three decades have reached unprecedented levels. However, as China begins to translate its economic influence in Central Asia into political one, Russia started feeling uneasy about losing its traditional sphere of influence in its 'Near-Abroad.' After the unveiling of 'One Belt One Road' (OBOR) initiative in 2013, President Putin, a year later, announced the 'Eurasian Economic Union' (EAEU). This was a calculated geopolitical decision on the part of Russia to rescue Central Asia from falling entirely in the Chinese sphere of influence. Against this backdrop, the regional order invites a deep sense of mistrust because there is a lack of realization on the part of both states as to where one's limits end and the other's begin. In the light of these developments, this study endeavors to address the question that why is Russia allowing China to expand its influence in Central Asia despite the growing economic asymmetry between them and what are the areas of convergence and divergence between them? The study hypothesizes that China and Russia have adopted the policy of competitive collaboration - cooperation where there exists convergence and competition when it comes to divergence of interests - in Central Asia.
