Sorting, incentives and risk preferences: Evidence from a field experiment

被引：34

作者：

Bellemare, Charles ^{[1
]}

Shearer, Bruce

机构：

[1] Univ Laval, Dept Econ, CIRPEE, Quebec City, PQ G1V0A6, Canada

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 108卷 / 03期

关键词：

Risk aversion; Sorting; Incentive contracts; Field experiments;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.010

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We conducted experiments within a firm to measure the risk preferences of workers who face substantial daily income risk. We find that these workers are significantly more risk-tolerant than individuals from the broader population. This is consistent with sorting: risk-tolerant workers are attracted to high-risk occupations. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：345 / 348

页数：4

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