SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM

被引：24

作者：

Edwards, Douglas ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Coll Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

[2] Univ Aberdeen, No Inst Philosophy, Aberdeen AB9 1FX, Scotland

来源：

SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2011年 / 49卷 / 01期

关键词：

MIXED INFERENCES; LOVE MINIMALISM; TRUTH; EXPRESSIVISTS; CONJUNCTIONS; ARGUMENT;

D O I：

10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.00043.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or "alethic pluralists") tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief-or any chosen truth-bearer-to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call "simple determination pluralism," that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.

引用

页码：28 / 48

页数：21

共 57 条

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