Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences

被引：5

作者：

Juarez, Ruben ^{[1
]}

You, Jung S. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Hawaii, Dept Econ, 2424 Maile Way,Saunders Hall 542, Honolulu, HI 96822 USA

[2] Calif State Univ Hayward, Dept Econ, Hayward, CA 94542 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN | 2019年 / 7卷 / 01期

关键词：

Single-peaked preferences; Strategy-proofness; Worst-case analysis; Efficiency; Uniform rule; Consistency; Divisible good; Economic surplus; D63; D70; D71; FAIR DIVISION; MONOTONIC SOLUTIONS; VCG MECHANISMS; ECONOMIES;

D O I：

10.1007/s40505-018-0141-z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Consider the problem of distributing a fixed amount of a divisible resource among agents whose preferences are single-peaked. The uniform rule has been widely characterized under an ordinal utility approach. Instead, in a cardinal utility approach, we show that the uniform rule is the only consistent rule that maximizes the worst-case surplus among strategy-proof and ordinally efficient mechanisms.

引用

页码：27 / 36

页数：10