Behavior in second-price auctions by highly experienced eBay buyers and sellers

被引:30
作者
Garratt, Rodney J. [2 ]
Walker, Mark [1 ]
Wooders, John [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[2] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Experience; eBay; Second-price; Sealed bid; Auction; RULES; GAMES;
D O I
10.1007/s10683-011-9287-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We report on sealed-bid second-price auctions that we conducted on the Internet using subjects with substantial prior experience: they were highly experienced participants in eBay auctions. Unlike the novice bidders in previous (laboratory) experiments, the experienced bidders exhibited no greater tendency to overbid than to underbid. However, even subjects with substantial prior experience tended not to bid their values, suggesting that the non-optimal bidding of novice subjects is robust to substantial experience in non-experimental auctions. We found that auction revenue was not significantly different from the expected revenue the auction would generate if bidders bid their values. Auction efficiency, as measured by the percentage of surplus captured, was substantially lower in our SPAs than in previous laboratory experiments.
引用
收藏
页码:44 / 57
页数:14
相关论文
共 13 条