Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure?

被引：30

作者：

Francis, Bill B. ^{[1
]}

Hasan, Iftekhar ^{[2
,3
,4
]}

Hunter, Delroy M. ^{[5
]}

Zhu, Yun ^{[6
]}

机构：

[1] Rensselaer Polytech Inst, Lally Sch Management, Troy, NY 12180 USA

[2] Fordham Univ, New York, NY 10023 USA

[3] Bank Finland, New York, NY 10023 USA

[4] Univ Sydney, New York, NY 10023 USA

[5] Univ S Florida, Muma Coll Business, Tampa, FL 33620 USA

[6] St Johns Univ, Peter J Tobin Coll Business, Jamaica, NY 11439 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2017年 / 46卷

关键词：

Risk-taking incentives; Managerial compensation; Exchange rate exposure; Risk management; Corporate governance; STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; CURRENCY DERIVATIVES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; COMPENSATION; INDUSTRY; MANAGEMENT; INVESTMENT; SENSITIVITIES; VOLATILITY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.06.015

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

There is scant evidence on how risk-taking incentives impact specific firm risks. This has implications for board oversight of managerial risk taking, firms' development of comparative advantage in taking particular risks, and compensation design. We examine this question for exchange rate risk. Using multiple identification strategies, we find that vega increases exchange rate exposure for purely domestic and globally engaged firms. Vega's impact increases with international operations, declines post-SOX, and is robust to firm-level governance. Our results suggest that evidence that exposure reduces firm value can be viewed, in part, as a wealth transfer from shareholders and debt-holders to managers. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：154 / 169

页数：16

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