Detection of Deception Attacks in Supervisory Control Systems Using Bond Graph

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems can be subject to cyber-attacks due to their extensive connectivity to information and communication technologies. Those communications are used to connect sensors, actuators, and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to monitor and control the process. The use of communication networks enlarges the vulnerability of SCADA to cyber-attacks that can drive the system to unsafe states. A variety of approaches in the field of attack detection have been proposed, however they are characterized very expensive, low detection rate or are system specific. One of the powerful cyber-attacks targeting SCADA systems is deception attack, where the attacker can change sensor reading parameters. In this work, we propose a new defense strategy that detects parameter changes generated by deception attacks in the sensor and control part in supervisory control systems. To do so, we use the bond graph (BG) modeling tool.