Relationship Between the Characteristics of CEOs and Excess Cash Holdings of Firms

被引：19
|
作者：
Lim, Jaemin [1 ]
Lee, Sang Cheol [2 ]
机构：
[1] Seoul Sch Integrated Sci & Technol, Dept Business Adm, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Dongguk Univ Seoul, Coll Business Adm, 30,Pildong Ro 1gil, Seoul 04620, South Korea
来源：
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE | 2019年 / 55卷 / 05期
关键词：
agency problems; CEO characteristics; excess cash holdings; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AUDIT COMMITTEE; AGENCY COSTS; PERFORMANCE; DETERMINANTS; INCENTIVES; LIQUIDITY; STRATEGY; BOARD; INVESTMENT;
D O I：
10.1080/1540496X.2018.1518778
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This study investigates the relationship between excess cash holdings of firms and CEO characteristics, such as ownership type, presence of stock options, inclusion in a chaebol, and CEO tenure. Based on a sample of non-financial listed Korean companies for 2000-2014, we find first, that professional CEOs have higher excess cash holdings than owner-managers have. Second, longer CEO tenure lowers excess cash holdings but decreases the marginal impact of CEO tenure on excess cash holdings. Third, the effect of CEO affiliation to a chaebol on excess cash holdings was greater before the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 than after it. Excess cash holdings arise from agency problems and the CEO horizon problem but agency problems between minority and dominant shareholders have eased in Korea since the crisis.
引用
收藏
页码：1069 / 1090
页数：22
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