The NCAA cartel and competitive balance in college football

被引:61
作者
Eckard, EW [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Colorado, Coll Business, Denver, CO 80217 USA
关键词
Cartel; NCAA; football; competition;
D O I
10.1023/A:1007713802480
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The NCAA regulates college football player recruiting, eligibility, and compensation. The economic theory of cartels suggests that one consequence may be reduced competitive balance. The enforced restrictions inhibit weak teams from improving, and protect strong teams from competition. A "stratification" is implied which should be evident over time as less "churning" in national rankings and conference standings, and fewer schools achieving national prominence. I test this general hypothesis by comparing various competitive balance measures for about 25 years before and after NCAA enforcement began in 1952. The hypothesis is supported by all measures;It both the national and conference levels.
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 369
页数:23
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