Competition and cooperation in non-centralized linear production games

被引：12

作者：

Fernández, FR

Fiestras-Janeiro, MG

García-Jurado, I

Puerto, J

机构：

[1] Univ Sevilla, Fac Matemat, Dept Estadist & Invest Operat, E-41012 Seville, Spain

[2] Univ Vigo, Fac Econ, Vigo 36200, Spain

[3] Univ Santiago de Compostela, Fac Matemat, Santiago De Compostela 15782, Spain

来源：

ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2005年 / 137卷 / 1-4期

关键词：

linear production games; Nash equilibrium; core;

D O I：

10.1007/s10479-005-2247-6

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In this paper we analyze how to improve the benefits of n producers when: (1) each producer i faces a linear production problem given by max{c(i)x(i) : A(i)x(i) <= b(i), x(i) >= 0}, and (2) maintaining the production capabilities of each producer is mandatory. In order to maximize the benefits, the producers decide to trade their resources while ensuring their initial individual gains. We study the games which describe this non-centralized linear production situation when players do not cooperate (section two), when players cooperate and side payments are possible (section three), and when players cooperate and side payments are not possible (section four).

引用

页码：91 / 100

页数：10

共 7 条

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CURIEL I, 1989, OR SPEKTRUM, V11, P83

[2]

Feltkamp V., 1993, ZOR, Methods and Models of Operations Research, V38, P153, DOI 10.1007/BF01414211

[3]

FERNANDEZ FR, 2003, OP RES P 2002 HEID, P465

[4] A GENERALIZED LINEAR PRODUCTION-MODEL - A UNIFYING MODEL [J].