Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies

被引:335
作者
Hellman, JS
Jones, G
Kaufmann, D
机构
[1] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[2] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
关键词
capture; corruption; influence; property rights; state capture; transition economies;
D O I
10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Hellman, Joel S., Jones, Geraint, and Kaufmann, Daniel-Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies Data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey is used to examine state capture and influence in transition economies. We find that a capture economy has emerged in many transition countries, where rent-generating advantages are sold by public officials and politicians to private firms. While influence is a legacy of the past inherited by large, incumbent firms with existing ties to the state, state capture is a strategic choice made primarily by large de novo firms competing against influential incumbents. Captor firms, in high-capture economies, enjoy private advantages in terms of more protection of their own property rights and superior firm performance. Despite the private gains to captor firms, state capture is associated at the aggregate level with social costs in the form of weaker economy-wide firm performance. (C) 2003 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:751 / 773
页数:23
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