Spatial prisoner's dilemma optimally played in small-world networks

被引：158

作者：

Masuda, N

Aihara, K

机构：

[1] Univ Tokyo, Grad Sch Frontier Sci, Dept Complex Sci & Engn, Bunkyo Ku, Tokyo 1138656, Japan

[2] Japan Sci & Technol Corp, Core Res Evolut Sci & Technol, Kawaguchi, Saitama 3320012, Japan

来源：

PHYSICS LETTERS A | 2003年 / 313卷 / 1-2期

基金：

日本学术振兴会;

关键词：

game theory; spatial prisoner's dilemma; small-world networks; evolution of cooperation;

D O I：

10.1016/S0375-9601(03)00693-5

中图分类号：

O4 [物理学];

学科分类号：

0702 ;

摘要：

Cooperation is commonly found in ecological and social systems even when it apparently seems that individuals can benefit from selfish behavior. We investigate how cooperation emerges with the spatial prisoner's dilemma played in a class of networks ranging from regular lattices to random networks. We find that, among these networks, small-world topology is the optimal structure when we take into account the speed at which cooperative behavior propagates. Our results may explain why the small-world properties are self-organized in real networks. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：55 / 61

页数：7

共 19 条

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