Product R&D Coopetition and Firm Performance

We investigate firms' behavior in demand-enhancing product R&D. We consider and compare a cooperative and non-cooperative R&D investment setting by firms. In a non-cooperative scenario (R&D competition), firms decide on their R&D investments and outputs unilaterally. In a cooperative scenario (R&D coopetition), firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. Firms through bargaining can reach an R&D agreement which specifies their R&D investment levels. The investment levels under R&D coopetition are higher compared with the investment levels under R&D competition. Firms' profits are also higher under R&D coopetition compared with R&D competition. We conclude that R&D coopetition can alleviate the individual R&D investment disincentive and work as a strategic instrument that enhances product innovation and firms' profits.