Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value

被引:23
作者
Chun, Youngsub [1 ]
Park, Boram [2 ]
机构
[1] Seoul Natl Univ, Dept Econ, Seoul 151746, South Korea
[2] Seoul Natl Univ, Dept Math Educ, Seoul 151746, South Korea
基金
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
Population solidarity; Population fair-ranking; Egalitarian value; Axiomatic characterizations; GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS; SHAPLEY VALUE; BANKRUPTCY; DIVISION; TALMUD;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-011-0284-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the implications of two axioms specifying how a value should respond to changes in the set of players for TU games. Population solidarity requires that the arrival of new players should affect all the original players in the same direction: all gain together or all lose together. On the other hand, population fair-ranking requires that the arrival of new players should not affect the relative positions of the original players. As a result, we obtain characterizations of the egalitarian value, which assigns to each player an equal share over an individual utility level. It is the only value satisfying either one of the two axioms together with efficiency, symmetry and strategic equivalence.
引用
收藏
页码:255 / 270
页数:16
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