Research on Repeated Game Between Food Enterprises and Government Regulators

被引:0
作者
Shi Yaneng [1 ]
机构
[1] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATION AND MANAGEMENT, VOLS I AND II | 2010年
关键词
Food enterprises; Government regulators; Repeated game; Discount rate; Pass rate;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In view of China's frequent food safety incidents in recent years, this paper builds a repeated game model to study the interaction between food enterprises and government regulators, based on quantifying the returns of them. It designs the optimum of food enterprises product pass rate under the current discount rate and the existing relationship. The result shows that regulation has an important impact on product pass rate of food enterprises, and it has positive significance to maintain appropriate regulation for both sides.
引用
收藏
页码:835 / 838
页数:4
相关论文
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