Credence good labeling: The efficiency and distributional implications of several policy approaches

被引:118
作者
Roe, Brian [1 ]
Sheldon, Ian [1 ]
机构
[1] Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
credence goods; labeling; vertical product differentiation;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01024.x
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
A model of vertical product differentiation is used to analyze the labeling of credence goods, focusing on the manner by which quality is communicated. The results indicate that firms prefer private labeling options. In addition, firms may hire private certifiers as well as paying for mandated government labels when the government's quality benchmark substantially deviates from firms' private quality choices. The average consumer prefers a mandatory, discrete label with a high-quality standard while poor consumers prefer a mandatory, discrete label with a low standard.
引用
收藏
页码:1020 / 1033
页数:14
相关论文
共 41 条
[1]  
Beath J., 1991, EC THEORY PRODUCT DI
[3]   On the taxation of polluting products in a differentiated industry [J].
Cremer, H ;
Thisse, JF .
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1999, 43 (03) :575-594
[4]   How should food safety certification be financed? [J].
Crespi, JM ;
Marette, S .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2001, 83 (04) :852-861
[5]   FREE COMPETITION AND OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF FRAUD [J].
DARBY, MR ;
KARNI, E .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1973, 16 (01) :67-88
[6]  
DIXIT AK, 1977, AM ECON REV, V67, P297
[7]   On doctors, mechanics, and computer specialists: The economics of credence goods [J].
Dulleck, U ;
Kerschbamer, R .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, 2006, 44 (01) :5-42
[8]   Credence goods and fraudulent experts [J].
Emons, W .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1997, 28 (01) :107-119
[9]   Credence goods monopolists [J].
Emons, W .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2001, 19 (3-4) :375-389
[10]  
Feddersen TJ, 2001, J ECON MANAGE STRAT, V10, P149