A reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling model of outside finance

被引:22
作者
Hellwig, Martin F. [1 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
关键词
Financial contracting; Debt finance; Equity finance; Moral hazard; Risk choices; CONTRACTS; DEBT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfi.2007.09.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The paper studies outside finance in a model of two-dimensional moral hazard, involving risk choices as well as effort choices. If the entrepreneur has insufficient funds, a first-best outcome cannot be implemented. Second-best outcomes involve greater failure risk than first-best outcomes. For a Cobb-Douglas technology, second-best effort and investment levels are smaller than first-best; for other technologies, the comparison depends on the elasticity of substitution. If firm returns are not too noisy as signals of behaviour, the optimal incentive scheme corresponds to some mix of debt and equity finance. If firm returns are too noisy, this interpretation is not available. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:495 / 525
页数:31
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