Game Analysis of the Post-Paris Agreement's Climate Policy

被引:0
|
作者
Shao Sujun [1 ]
Rong Xue [1 ]
Zheng Fangyuan [1 ]
机构
[1] Yunnan Univ, Dev Inst, Kunming, Yunnan, Peoples R China
关键词
Paris Agreement; Climate Policy; Two-Level Game; Repeated Game;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
The Paris Agreement is an important global agreement to cope with climate change. The withdrawal of the United States has made the implementation prospects of the Paris Agreement full of variables. This paper analyzes the post-Paris Agreement climate policy based on the two-level game theory and repeated game models. The trend of climate policy proves that the Paris Agreement will still be implemented due to its own advantages. However, if the objectives of the Paris Agreement to be fully realized, it is necessary to improve various laws and form effective constraints and incentive mechanisms.
引用
收藏
页码:361 / 368
页数:8
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