Institutional Barriers to Sustainable Forest Management: Evidence from an Experimental Study in Tajikistan

被引:8
作者
Kasymov, Ulan [1 ,2 ]
Wang, Xiaoxi [3 ,4 ,5 ]
Zikos, Dimitrios [6 ]
Chopan, Massih [2 ]
Ibele, Benedikt [7 ]
机构
[1] Tech Univ Dresden, Int Inst Zittau, Chair Ecosyst Serv, Markt 23, D-02763 Zittau, Germany
[2] Humboldt Univ, Resource Econ Grp, Unten Linden 6, D-10099 Berlin, Germany
[3] China Acad Rural Dev, Yuhangtang Rd 866, Hangzhou 310058, Peoples R China
[4] Zhejiang Univ, Dept Agr Econ & Management, Yuhangtang Rd 866, Hangzhou 310058, Peoples R China
[5] Potsdam Inst Climate Impact Res, D-14473 Potsdam, Germany
[6] Hsch Tech & Wirtschaft Berlin, Dept Econ MIDE, Treskowallee 8, D-10318 Berlin, Germany
[7] Deutsch Gesell Int Zusammenarbeit GIZ GmbH, Bonn, Germany
关键词
Institutions; Communication; Environmental and institutional uncertainties; Field experiment; Forest management; Central Asia; GOVERNANCE; RULES; COMMONS; COOPERATION; IRRIGATION; PAYMENTS; SUCCESS; FIELD; POWER; GAME;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107276
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
Joint Forest Management (JFM) is a form of participatory forest governance that aims for protection, conservation and sustainable use of forest resources by involving local communities. The JFM reforms have been promoted to address forest and land degradation, as vital in reducing institutional uncertainty in complex environments and strengthening cooperation among resource users. We draw on theories of collective action and transaction costs assuming that the overharvesting problem can be reduced by efficient and effective rules that support cooperation between forest users in using common pool resources at the group level and explore how forest users respond to policies that aim to reduce overharvesting in Tajikistan. To this end, we used a framed field experiment involving actual forest resource users. We find a strong impact of rules and the associated transaction costs in dealing with environmental and institutional uncertainties. The experiment results indicate that the harvesting rate is likely to decrease when institutionalized mechanisms are introduced to coordinate the interdependence among resource users. The overall results suggest that the rule determining harvest on a rotational basis is effective in reducing harvesting under environmental uncertainty regardless of the existence of communication and under institutional uncertainty when communication is permitted.
引用
收藏
页数:15
相关论文
共 42 条
[1]   Explaining success on the commons: Community forest governance in the Indian Himalaya [J].
Agrawal, A ;
Chhatre, A .
WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 2006, 34 (01) :149-166
[2]   Changing governance of the world's forests [J].
Agrawal, Arun ;
Chhatre, Ashwini ;
Hardin, Rebecca .
SCIENCE, 2008, 320 (5882) :1460-1462
[3]  
Akhmadov K, 2008, GENEVA TIMBER FOREST
[4]   Experimental evidence on payments for forest commons conservation [J].
Andersson, Krister P. ;
Cook, Nathan J. ;
Grillos, Tara ;
Lopez, Maria Claudia ;
Salk, Carl F. ;
Wright, Glenn D. ;
Mwangi, Esther .
NATURE SUSTAINABILITY, 2018, 1 (03) :128-135
[5]   A global review of ecological fiscal transfers [J].
Busch, Jonah ;
Ring, Irene ;
Akullo, Monique ;
Amarjargal, Oyut ;
Borie, Maud ;
Cassola, Rodrigo S. ;
Cruz-Trinidad, Annabelle ;
Droste, Nils ;
Haryanto, Joko Tri ;
Kasymov, Ulan ;
Kotenko, Nataliia Viktorivna ;
Lhkagvadorj, Ariunaa ;
De Paulo, Felipe Luiz Lima ;
May, Peter H. ;
Mukherjee, Anit ;
Mumbunan, Sonny ;
Santos, Rui ;
Tacconi, Luca ;
Verde Selva, Gracie ;
Verma, Madhu ;
Wang, Xiaoxi ;
Yu, Lu ;
Zhou, Kecen .
NATURE SUSTAINABILITY, 2021, 4 (09) :756-765
[6]   Risk attitudes and economic well-being in Latin America [J].
Camilo Cardenas, Juan ;
Carpenter, Jeffrey .
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2013, 103 :52-61
[7]   Social Norms and Behavior in the Local Commons as Seen Through the Lens of Field Experiments [J].
Camilo Cardenas, Juan .
ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, 2011, 48 (03) :451-485
[8]   What do people bring into the game?: Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons [J].
Cárdenas, JC ;
Ostrom, E .
AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS, 2004, 82 (03) :307-326
[9]   Norms from outside and from inside: an experimental analysis on the governance of local ecosystems [J].
Cardenas, JC .
FOREST POLICY AND ECONOMICS, 2004, 6 (3-4) :229-241
[10]  
Cardenas JC, 2013, HANDBOOK ON EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, P319