Exclusive dealing without territory exclusivity in multichannel systems: managing channel conflict and driving commitment

被引:11
作者
Vinhas, Alberto Sa [1 ]
Gibbs, Richard [1 ]
机构
[1] Washington State Univ, Coll Business, 14204 NE Salmon Creek Ave, Vancouver, WA 98686 USA
关键词
Distribution channels; Exclusive dealing; Multiple channels; Cross-channel synergies; Relationship conflict; COMMUNICATION; METAANALYSIS; VARIABLES; INDUSTRY; MODELS;
D O I
10.1007/s11002-018-9462-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The exclusive dealing literature suggests that manufacturers should protect exclusive dealers (ED) from intrabrand competition by assigning exclusive territories (ET). We consider ED systems without ET and investigate how manufacturers can enhance ED channel outcomes, such as the ED's level of commitment to the relationship, by strategically managing its downstream communication efforts with ED and non-ED channels. We show that these cross-channel communication efforts (i.e., the quality of communication between the manufacturer and non-ED resellers in the ED reseller's territory) are important drivers of relationship conflict and commitment for ED resellers, while playing a limited role for non-ED resellers. These results underscore the need for manufacturers to understand the perspectives and behaviors of each individual channel within a multichannel system and manage their different distribution channel types as an integrated system. We find support for our hypotheses in a sample of 672 observations corresponding to different ED and non-ED resellers selling a manufacturer's product-line across several European countries.
引用
收藏
页码:291 / 305
页数:15
相关论文
共 28 条
[1]   THE USE OF PLEDGES TO BUILD AND SUSTAIN COMMITMENT IN DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS [J].
ANDERSON, E ;
WEITZ, B .
JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, 1992, 29 (01) :18-34
[2]   A MODEL OF DISTRIBUTOR FIRM AND MANUFACTURER FIRM WORKING PARTNERSHIPS [J].
ANDERSON, JC ;
NARUS, JA .
JOURNAL OF MARKETING, 1990, 54 (01) :42-58
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2002, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR
[4]   EQUILIBRIUM INCENTIVES FOR EXCLUSIVE DEALING IN A DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS OLIGOPOLY [J].
BESANKO, D ;
PERRY, MK .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1993, 24 (04) :646-667
[5]  
Bork Robert., 1978, ANTITRUST PARADOX
[6]   MEASURES OF MANIFEST CONFLICT IN DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS [J].
BROWN, JR ;
DAY, RL .
JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, 1981, 18 (03) :263-274
[7]  
Chard JS, 1986, MARKETING CHANNELS R, P39
[8]  
ETGAR M, 1979, J RETAILING, V55, P61
[9]   Patterns of credible commitments: Territory and brand selectivity in industrial distribution channels [J].
Fein, AJ ;
Anderson, E .
JOURNAL OF MARKETING, 1997, 61 (02) :19-34
[10]   EVALUATING STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS WITH UNOBSERVABLE VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT ERROR [J].
FORNELL, C ;
LARCKER, DF .
JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, 1981, 18 (01) :39-50