Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma

被引:33
作者
Miettinen, Topi [1 ]
Suetens, Sigrid [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, SITE, Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Tilburg Univ, CentER, Tilburg, Netherlands
[3] Tilburg Univ, TIBER, Tilburg, Netherlands
[4] Tilburg Univ, TILEC, Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
cooperation; guilt; experiments; prisoner's dilemma; preplay communication;
D O I
10.1177/0022002708322325
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
In this article, the authors measure experienced guilt in a prisoner's-dilemma experiment with preplay communication. The authors find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. The authors also find that fining unilateral defection reduces feelings of guilt.
引用
收藏
页码:945 / 960
页数:16
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