How Natural Selection Can Create Both Self- and Other-Regarding Preferences, and Networked Minds

被引:31
作者
Grund, Thomas [1 ,2 ]
Waloszek, Christian [1 ]
Helbing, Dirk [1 ]
机构
[1] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Dept Humanities Social & Polit Sci, Zurich, Switzerland
[2] Univ Montreal, Ctr Int Criminol Comparee, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
EVOLUTION; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; COMPETITION; BEHAVIOR; TRAGEDY;
D O I
10.1038/srep01480
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Biological competition is widely believed to result in the evolution of selfish preferences. The related concept of the 'homo economicus' is at the core of mainstream economics. However, there is also experimental and empirical evidence for other-regarding preferences. Here we present a theory that explains both, self-regarding and other-regarding preferences. Assuming conditions promoting non-cooperative behaviour, we demonstrate that intergenerational migration determines whether evolutionary competition results in a 'homo economicus' (showing self-regarding preferences) or a 'homo socialis' (having other-regarding preferences). Our model assumes spatially interacting agents playing prisoner's dilemmas, who inherit a trait determining 'friendliness', but mutations tend to undermine it. Reproduction is ruled by fitness-based selection without a cultural modification of reproduction rates. Our model calls for a complementary economic theory for 'networked minds' (the 'homo socialis') and lays the foundations for an evolutionarily grounded theory of other-regarding agents, explaining individually different utility functions as well as conditional cooperation.
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页数:5
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