Separable Hedonic Games and Contractually Stabilities

被引:0
作者
Tanaka, Masaya [1 ]
Sung, Shao-Chin [1 ]
机构
[1] Aoyama Gakuin Univ, Chuo Ku, 5-10-1 Fuchinobe, Sagamihara, Kanagawa 2525258, Japan
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH CZECH-JAPAN SEMINAR ON DATA ANALYSIS AND DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY | 2017年
关键词
Hedonic Game; Separability; Contractually Stabilities; CORE;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
We are concerned with the problem of constructing stable partitions for hedonic games with respect from contractually stability concepts, including contractually individual (CI), contractually core (CC), contractually strict core (CSC). In general, every instance of hedonic games has at least one stable partition when one of the contractually stability concepts is under consideration. For additive instances, it is known that a CI stable partition can be constructed in quadratic time in term of the number of players. In this paper, we consider a wider domain, namely separable instances. A instance of hedonic games is separable when any player classifies any other players as friends, enemies or others and the classification characterize her or his preference. However, it is not clear whether such a stable partition can be constructed efficiently with the characteristic of separable instance. We propose two quadratic time algorithms which respectively construct a CI stable partition and a CC stable partition for every separable instance. Moreover, we show that CSC stable partition can be obtained by one of the proposed algorithms when a subdomain of separable instance is under consideration.
引用
收藏
页码:204 / 211
页数:8
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