EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY AND TRUST: IN DEFENSE OF ZAGZEBSKI'S THEORY

Epistemic authority, according to L. Zagzebski's theory, is essen-tially based on deliberative or first-personal reasons, which origi-nate from epistemic admiration. In what follows, I shortly re-construct her theory and try to defend it against two critical arguments. The first argument calls attention to circular relation of epistemic autonomy and authority. In order to determine the authoritative person for me, I always have to possess epistemic autonomy, which is understood as knowledge in the given domain. Thus I myself have to have authority in the given domain in order to invest authority. I try to show that the investment of trust is based upon autonomy interpreted as an ability to exercise epis-temic actions, accompanied by normative foreknowledge, that al-lows us to assess epistemic abilities and invest our trust without having sufficient propositional knowledge. The second argument insists on theoretical control for authoritative evidence and testi-mony. That contradicts preemptive character and content -inde-pendence inherent to authoritative testimony. Hence, this argu-ment entirely misses the point of epistemic authority. Instead, as I argue, one can control epistemic authority by future reflexion on its conscientiousness and epistemic exercise as well as on origins of my admiration for authority. As a consequence, the trust in-vested in authority can be withdrawn and redistributed.