Social security: National policies with international implications

被引:12
作者
Pemberton, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Reading, Reading RG6 2AH, Berks, England
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0297.00459
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Social security policies within individual countries are determined independently by national governments, but the resulting outcome is inefficient compared with what would result from the international co-ordination of policies. This is because national social security policies produce international externalities via their effects on world interest rates. An illustrative example suggests that the gains from co-ordination are potentially significant.
引用
收藏
页码:492 / 508
页数:17
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