Do CEOs Ever Lose? Fairness Perspective on the Allocation of Residuals Between CEOs and Shareholders

被引：24

作者：

Kolev, Kalin ^{[1
]}

Wiseman, Robert M. ^{[2
]}

Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Marquette Univ, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA

[2] Michigan State Univ, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA

[3] Univ Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT | 2017年 / 43卷 / 02期

关键词：

CEO compensation; agency theory; board monitoring; distributive justice; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE; AGENCY PROBLEMS; STOCK-OPTIONS; PANEL-DATA; FIRM; BOARD;

D O I：

10.1177/0149206314535437

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this study we introduce a justice perspective to examining the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards over the allocation of firm residuals that ultimately determines CEO compensation. Framing CEO pay as the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards focuses attention on the power of CEOs to increase their share of firm residuals in the form of increased compensation, and the diligence of boards of directors to constrain CEO opportunism. Framing this negotiation through a theory of justice offers an alternative perspective to the search for pay-performance sensitivity. We predict and find that as board diligence in controlling opportunism declines and CEO power increases, CEOs are increasingly able to capture a larger portion of firm residuals relative to shareholders. This finding supports critics who charge that CEO pay violates norms of distributive and procedural justice.

引用

页码：610 / 637

页数：28

共 109 条

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