Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods

被引：3

作者：

Cheikbossian, Guillaume ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Montpellier, CEE M, CNRS, INRAE,SupAgro, Montpellier, France

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2021年 / 127卷

关键词：

Indirect evolutionary approach; Evolutionary stability; Altruism; Group contest; Public goods; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; PREFERENCE EVOLUTION; PAROCHIAL ALTRUISM; GROUP COMPETITION; COLLECTIVE ACTION; SOCIAL-BEHAVIOR; RENT-SEEKING; COMPLEMENTARITIES; COEVOLUTION; CONTESTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest for a (local) public good, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another, or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely are group members altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：206 / 226

页数：21

共 6 条

[1] Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 2012, 306 : 61 - 67
[2] In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict
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Gross, Jorg
Meder, Zsombor
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[3] Oxytocin Motivates Non-Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict to Protect Vulnerable In-Group Members
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[4] Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect
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[5] Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect
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[6] Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation
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PUBLIC CHOICE, 2018, 174 (3-4) : 315 - 334

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