Belief-based equilibrium

被引：5

作者：

Sandroni, A ^{[1
]}

Smorodinsky, R

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, Dept Managerial Econ & Decis Sci, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2004年 / 47卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

equilibrium; calibration; rationality; learning;

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00152-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We introduce a new solution concept for short-sighted players engaging in a repeated interaction: a Belief-based equilibrium (BBE). In a BBE, players optimize myopically given their beliefs which are not necessarily correct, but are not contradicted by the data. We show that, if the stage game has a unique correlated equilibrium then the play of a BBE resembles a Nash equilibrium play. However, a BBE may not be a Nash equilibrium. In particular, in a BBE players may play deterministically when the only Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：157 / 171

页数：15

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