The Time in two-dimensional View

B-time, i.e. the temporal scale of the B-series of events, is one and the same for all times, while A-times (the temporal scales of A-series) are as many as there are moments of time. This means that A-theorists will have to consider one-dimensional time two-dimensionally: as changing within itself at every moment. The two-dimensional view is here put to service for a meta-compatibilist theory of freedom, a theory, that is, which reconciles freedom, determinism and their first order incompatibility at the second order. Kant's position is interpreted as meta-compatibilist as well, but as having the drawback of separating time and freedom. In order to appreciate the connection of time and freedom, one has to acknowledge that in free acts the future is determined further according to plan, while at the same time the past is (with nomological necessity) co-determined further in countless unclear and inscrutable ways. A free act thus consumes its own range of freedom by positing retroactively the sufficient causal antecedents for its taking place: It was free before it occurred and is part of nature after.