Monitoring by Affiliated Bankers on Board of Directors: Evidence from Corporate Financing Outcomes

被引:68
作者
Sisli-Ciamarra, Elif [1 ]
机构
[1] Brandeis Int Business Sch, Waltham, MA 02453 USA
关键词
INFORMATION MONOPOLIES; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; DETERMINANTS; VARIABLES; CHOICE; LOANS; INTERMEDIATION; CONTRACTS; MODELS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01191.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using a hand-collected data set on boards of directors of large US nonfinancial companies, this paper investigates the effects of the presence of a creditor on a company's board. The results suggest that the presence of a creditor: 1) increases the amount of debt in a company's capital structure via an increase in private debt, 2) decreases the sensitivity of debt financing to the amount of tangible assets that a company holds, 3) decreases the cost of borrowing, and 4) reduces the pledge of collateral and financial covenants in debt contracts.
引用
收藏
页码:665 / 702
页数:38
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