Analysis of Behavior Characteristics of the Main Body of Crop Insurance under Asymmetric Information Environmental Condition

被引:0
作者
Cheng, Wei [1 ,2 ]
Li, Dan [1 ]
机构
[1] Northeast Agr Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Harbin 150030, Heilongjiang, Peoples R China
[2] Heilongjiang Bayi Agr Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Daqing 163319, Heilongjiang, Peoples R China
来源
EKOLOJI | 2019年 / 28卷 / 107期
关键词
information asymmetry; agricultural insurance; insurance subject; behavior characteristics; environmental characteristics;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
In this study we combined the data generated through a process with geospatial data on plot locations and environmental characteristics, administrative data from the insurance company and comprehensive survey data. To study the behavior differences of small-scale farmers and new-type agricultural operating entities as insured subjects in the agricultural insurance market under the condition of information asymmetry. To study how the ways of information acquisition affect the satisfaction of purchasing agricultural insurance, thus affecting future insurance demanding behavior. This paper collects data and designs information acquisition satisfaction table for small-scale farmers and managers of new-type agricultural operating entities by field interviews, and makes nested design analysis for the obtained satisfaction value. The empirical test results show that there are great differences in information acquisition behavior between small-scale farmers which leads to different satisfaction of information acquisition. It is suggested that the agricultural insurance policy formulation should considers the differences behavioral characteristics of small-scale farmers and new-type agricultural operating entities. And agricultural insurance companies should provide insurance products corresponding to the behavior characteristics of small-scale farmers and new-type agricultural operating entities.
引用
收藏
页码:3397 / 3403
页数:7
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