Shareholder wealth effects of CEO departures: evidence from the UK

被引：63

作者：

Dedman, E

Lin, SWJ

机构：

[1] Univ Bristol, Dept Econ, Bristol BS8 1TN, Avon, England

[2] Univ Manchester, Dept Accounting & Finance, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2002年 / 8卷 / 01期

关键词：

corporate governance; managerial departure; board structure;

D O I：

10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00027-X

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper examines share price behaviour surrounding announcements of CEO departures from UK firms listed on the All Share Index between 1990 and 1995. We find that many firms choose not to announce CEO departures, and that these firms have poorer performance records, and higher chances of future failure, than those firms who officially announce CEO turnover to the London Stock Exchange. The market reacts negatively to announcements of top executive departures, especially when the CEO is dismissed or leaves to take up another job. Share price reactions to the disclosure of top executive departure are significantly affected by the financial risk of the firm and whether the board announces a replacement CEO. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：81 / 104

页数：24

共 26 条

[1] EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION, MANAGEMENT TURNOVER, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION [J].