Migration and Foreign Aid

被引:78
作者
Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett [1 ]
Leblang, David [2 ]
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Publ Policy & Polit Sci, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[2] Univ Virginia, Polit, Charlottesville, VA USA
关键词
POLITICAL-ECONOMY; BILATERAL AID; DOMESTIC POLITICS; EXTREME-RIGHT; POLICY MODEL; PANEL-DATA; IMMIGRATION; AMERICAN; CITIZENSHIP; PREFERENCES;
D O I
10.1017/S0020818315000119
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
When it comes to linkages between migration and the global allocation of foreign development assistance, the size of the immigrant population from a recipient country residing in a donor country is an important determinant of dyadic aid commitments. Two complementary hypotheses probe this relationship. First, donors use foreign aid to achieve their broader immigration goals, targeting migrant-sending areas to increase development and decrease the demand for entry into the donor country. Second, migrants already residing in the donor country mobilize to lobby for additional aid for their homeland. Empirical tests on a large sample of country pairs made up of twenty-two donors and more than 150 recipients over the period 1993 to 2008 show robust support for these hypotheses.
引用
收藏
页码:627 / 657
页数:31
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