Combining "real effort" with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task

被引:40
作者
Gachter, Simon [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Huang, Lingbo [1 ,2 ]
Sefton, Martin [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nottingham, CeDEx, Sir Clive Granger Bldg,Univ Pk, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
[2] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, Sir Clive Granger Bldg,Univ Pk, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
[3] CESifo, Munich, Germany
[4] IZA, Bonn, Germany
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Real effort task; Piece-rate theory; Team incentives; Gift exchange; Tournaments; Online real effort experiments; LABOR; INCENTIVES; PAY; CONTESTS; AVERSION;
D O I
10.1007/s10683-015-9465-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We introduce the "ball-catching task", a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action ("catching balls") with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications.
引用
收藏
页码:687 / 712
页数:26
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